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Outsider Speech: The PLRA,
AEDPA, and Adjudicative
Expression
William M. Carter, Jr.†
“By taking the right to speak from some and giving it to others,
the Government deprives the disadvantaged person or class of the
right to use speech to strive to establish worth, standing, and
respect for the speaker’s voice.”
—Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340–41 (2010).
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Introduction
The Prison Litigation Reform Act1 and the Anti-Terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act2 imposed sweeping new restrictions upon
incarcerated persons’ access to and use of the federal courts. The PLRA
and AEDPA contain many troubling specific provisions; this Essay,
however, will focus holistically upon the effects of these statutes in
limiting incarcerated persons’ access to the federal courts and cabining
the claims that incarcerated persons may assert in federal courts. Taken
as a whole, these statutes “were intended to, and did in fact, make it
harder for prisoners to advance constitutional claims in federal court.”3
†

Professor of Law and John E. Murray Faculty Scholar, University of
Pittsburgh School of Law.

1.

Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (codified in relevant part and
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1997e).

2.

Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214.

3.

Michael M. O’Hear, Not So Sweet: Questions Raised by Sixteen Years of
the PLRA and AEDPA, 24 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 223, 223 (2012).
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Federal laws that raise (or lower) the barriers to entry for certain
claims in federal courts are neither per se unusual nor inherently
troublesome. From the basic rules of practice and procedure4 to more
targeted provisions regulating perceived excesses in litigation generally5
or certain types of litigation specifically,6 legislation and court rules
often regulate litigation and access to the court system.7 Seldom, however, does legislation single out a specific class of people—incarcerated
persons, in the case of the PLRA and AEDPA—and target them for
restrictions upon their access to and use of the courts that are both
wholesale and sui generis to the class.8 Indeed, Human Rights Watch
has noted that it is unaware “of any other country in which national
legislation singles out prisoners for a unique set of barriers to vindicating their legal rights in court.”9
Indiscriminate class-based legislation of this nature is unusual. It is
not unprecedented, however: similar restrictions were imposed upon
enslaved persons as well as free Black people during the pre-Civil War

4.

See, e.g., Fed. R. Crim. P., Fed. R. Evid., and Fed. R. Civ. P.

5.

See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (authorizing the imposition of financial sanctions upon “[a]ny attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any
court of the United States” who “multiplies the proceedings in any case
unreasonably and vexatiously”).

6.

See, e.g., Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No.
104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (limiting securities-fraud class-action suits in various
ways and aiming to reduce frivolous securities litigation).

7.

This is not to suggest that the examples of such regulations cited above
are all normatively desirable or justifiable, of course. See, e.g., Christopher
J. Peters, Adjudicative Speech and the First Amendment, 51 UCLA L.
Rev. 705 (2004) (considering whether and how the various restrictions on
advocates’ courtroom speech, such as the Rules of Evidence and restrictions upon citations to unpublished judicial opinions, can be reconciled
with free speech values); Jules Lobel, Courts as Forums for Protest, 52
UCLA L. Rev. 477, 561 (2004) (arguing, inter alia, that “[b]ecause of
the importance of encouraging people to engage in discussion about current
social issues, and because of the implications for freedom of speech, courts
should not allow sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 or
other similar rules to stifle popular debate stirred by lawsuits that may
be considered ‘frivolous’ because they argue against precedent or are viewed
as losing cases”).

8.

“Setting out to protect the federal courts against a presumed flood of
[frivolous prisoner litigation], the PLRA established an array of barriers to
constitutional litigation that apply to no litigants other than prisoners . . . .”
Susan N. Herman, Prison Reform Litigation Acts, 24 Fed. Sent’g Rep.
263, 265 (2012).

9.

No Equal Justice: The Prison Litigation Reform Act in the United States,
Hum. Rts. Watch (June 16, 2009), https://www.hrw.org/report/2009/
06/16/no-equal-justice/prison-litigation-reform-act-united-states [https://
perma.cc/ZEB6-53GV].
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legal regime.10 To be clear at the outset: this Essay does not contend
that incarcerated persons are slaves. Nor does this Essay seek to
analogize incarceration to enslavement or to argue that the conditions
that incarcerated persons face are the same as those faced by enslaved
persons.11 Rather, this Essay examines the PLRA and AEDPA through
the lens of the American slave system’s limitations upon access to the
courts by enslaved persons and free Black persons. Doing so helps to
illuminate the ways in which the former replicates the latter for a
similarly racialized12 and socially alienated group deemed outcasts from
civil society.

10.

Congress has also adopted wholesale and sui generis restrictions upon
procedural rights and court access in the various “war on terror” statutes
enacted in the wake of the September 11 attacks. See, e.g., Detainee
Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2680; Military
Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600. As with
incarcerated persons, the outcast status of persons accused of terrorist
activity both motivated Congress to adopt and was used by Congress to
justify dramatic departures from the ordinary procedural rights applicable
to all other persons. See 10 U.S.C. § 948b(a) (explaining the purpose of
the Military Commissions Act of 2006).

11.

Many thoughtful scholars, observers, and formerly incarcerated persons
have made such arguments. This Essay simply takes no position on these
analogies and comparisons. Nor does this Essay address whether the
treatment of incarcerated persons may in some cases amount to slave-like
conditions, such as through the use of prison labor. See, e.g., Michele
Goodwin, The Thirteenth Amendment: Modern Slavery, Capitalism, and
Mass Incarceration, 104 Cornell L. Rev. 899 (2019).

12.

As is well known, America’s system of mass incarceration is highly
racialized. See, e.g., Ashley Nellis, The Color of Justice 2016 Report,
Sent’g Project (June 14, 2016), https://www.sentencingproject.org/
publications/the-color-of-justice-2016-report/ [https://perma.cc/RMU7H8R8] (noting, inter alia, that as of 2016, “African-Americans [were]
incarcerated in state prisons at a rate that is 5.1 times” the rate of whites
on average, and in five states, at ten times the rate of whites); Criminal
Justice Fact Sheet, NAACP, https://naacp.org/resources/criminal-justicefact-sheet [https://perma.cc/45UG-MNJM] (last visited Mar. 1, 2022)
(stating that “56% of the US incarcerated population [is] represented
by African Americans and Hispanics,” although they comprise only
32% of the total U.S. population); Katie Mettler, States Imprison
Black People at Five Times the Rate of Whites—A Sign of a Narrowing
Yet Still-Wide Gap, Wash. Post (Dec. 4, 2019), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/crime-law/2019/12/04/states-imprison-black-peoplefive-times-rate-whites-sign-narrowing-yet-still-wide-gap/ [https://perma.cc/
N7UZ-8KUJ] (noting that among the federal prison population, the
black-to-white incarceration rate “fell from 8.4-to-1 to 7-to-1 between 2001
and 2017, and the ratio between white and Hispanic people decreased
from 7.3-to-1 to 4.6-to-1,” nonetheless remaining at very high levels of
disparity).
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I.

The PLRA and AEDPA: Background

Taken together, “[t]he PLRA and AEDPA both constitute
multipronged attacks on the ability of prisoners to secure relief from
federal courts for claimed violations of their constitutional rights.”13 As
relevant to this Essay, these statutes constrain incarcerated persons’14
access to the courts by, inter alia: requiring the payment of court filing
fees even in cases brought by indigent prisoners;15 imposing a new limitations period of one year for habeas corpus claims;16 strictly limiting the
filing of multiple habeas petitions;17 imposing new statutory limitations
upon federal-court habeas review of state-court decisions;18 and capping
attorney’s fees in a manner likely to diminish the willingness of counsel
to represent incarcerated persons or to affect the quality of representation by those attorneys who do so.19 In addition to their instrumental
effects in deterring litigation by incarcerated persons (including litigation that may well be fully meritorious), scholars have argued that these
statutes also have the effect—and perhaps the intent—of serving as an
additional form of punishment by demeaning and degrading the individual’s worth by subjecting them to a different set of rules conveying
their lesser status as members of society. Under this view, the process
is itself punishment, amounting to “a separate and unequal system of
court access that applies only to prisoners.”20
13.

O’Hear, supra note 3, at 223.

14.

It is notable that the PLRA’s “restrictions apply not only to persons who
have been convicted of crime, but also to pretrial detainees who have not
yet been tried and are presumed innocent.” No Equal Justice, supra note
9.

15.

O’Hear, supra note 3, at 224.

16.

Id.

17.

Id.

18.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) (providing that federal habeas review shall
not be granted unless the state court’s judgment was contrary to U.S.
Supreme Court decisions or is determined to have been an “unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State
court proceeding”).

19.

Robert L. Tsai, Conceptualizing Constitutional Litigation as AntiGovernment Expression: A Speech-Centered Theory of Court Access, 51
Am. U. L. Rev. 835, 890 (2002) (arguing that, by “restrict[ing] the recovery of fees to no greater than ‘150[%] of the hourly rate established . . .
for payment of court-appointed counsel,’” and capping any attorney’s fees
at 150% of the judgment in those cases where monetary damages are
obtained, the PLRA “discourages attorneys from taking on prisoners as
clients, and creates disincentives to perform the work competently when
representation is undertaken” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(3))).

20.

David C. Fathi, The Prison Litigation Reform Act: A Threat to Civil
Rights, 24 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 260, 260 (2012); cf. Malcolm M. Feeley,
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The PLRA’s and AEDPA’s limits upon incarcerated persons’ use
of the courts may well have led to meritorious claims of serious
constitutional violations or personal injuries going unredressed.21 But
even assuming for the sake of argument that all of the claims disallowed,
restricted, or otherwise burdened by these statutes would have been
unsuccessful (a highly unlikely scenario), this Essay suggests that
something has been lost nonetheless: namely, the ability of incarcerated
persons to be treated with equal worth and dignity in seeking to utilize
the courts to redress their perceived grievances and to communicate
those grievances to the government and the public through the courts.22
The next section of this Essay examines the literature regarding
litigation as a form of expression.

II. Litigation as Expression
The American constitutional tradition values freedom of expression
for several independent reasons, two of which are especially pertinent
to adjudicative speech. The first relates to the democratic process. In
Justice Brandeis’s famous formulation:
[The Framers] believed that freedom to think as you will and to
speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and
The Process is the Punishment: Handling Cases in a Lower
Criminal Court 277 (1979) (questioning “the efficacy of the adversary
process and the value of elaborate procedures as institutions for protecting
individual rights” in the criminal-justice system because “the cost of
invoking one’s rights is frequently greater than the loss of the rights themselves”).
21.

See, e.g., Nancy J. King, Non-Capital Habeas Cases after Appellate
Review: An Empirical Analysis, 24 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 308 (2012)
(analyzing a data set of 2,188 non-capital habeas cases in 2003 and 2004
and finding a 20% decrease in the rate at which habeas review was granted
as compared to the pre-AEDPA rate). To be sure, the overall grant rate
in raw numbers was very low both pre-AEDPA and post-AEDPA during
the period studied (1% versus 0.8%); further, there may have been causes
other than AEDPA that led to the decline. Whatever the effect of AEDPA
on habeas grant rates, however, it seems clear that prisoner litigation
overall has seen a sharp decline post-PLRA. See, e.g., Maggie Filler &
Daniel Greenfield, A Wrong Without a Right? Overcoming the Prison
Litigation Reform Act’s Physical Injury Requirement in Solitary Confinement Cases, 115 Nw. U. L. Rev. 257, 258 (2020) (stating that “in the
years since the PLRA was enacted, prisoner lawsuits have slowed to a
comparative trickle” (citing, inter alia, Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 1555, 1694 (2003) (“The [PLRA] has been
highly successful in reducing litigation, triggering a forty-three percent
decline over five years, notwithstanding the simultaneous twenty-three
percent increase in the incarcerated population.”))).

22.

To be clear, I am speaking here of claims that are colorable but would
ultimately be found unsuccessful on the merits, not claims that are legally
frivolous.
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spread of political truth; that without free speech and assembly
discussion would be futile; that with them, discussion affords
ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of
noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert
people; that public discussion is a political duty; and that this
should be a fundamental principle of the American government.23

Adjudicative speech can relate to the democratic process in several
ways: among them, it can serve as a form of dissent against the
government;24 as a means to galvanize political change through
“persistent and persuasive appeals to the public consciousness”;25 as a
way to “force the government’s attention on the claims of the governed
when no other mechanism could”;26 and, in the case of collective litigation, allowing like-minded persons to amplify their voices through
association, in a manner akin to a political party.27 Indeed, the Supreme
Court’s pre-PLRA jurisprudence explicitly recognized that incarcerated
persons’ adjudicative speech can be an alternate form of participation
in the political process, stating that “[b]ecause a prisoner ordinarily is
divested of the privilege to vote, the right to file a court action might
be said to be his remaining most ‘fundamental political right, . . . preservative of all rights.’”28
Freedom of expression is also valued as an aspect of the individual’s
dignity and autonomy. Protecting speech for its own sake, separate
from any instrumental value that it may have, “sees expression as intrinsically important”29 to all persons, and especially to persons belonging to subordinated groups whose voices tend to be undervalued. This
view was noted in Justice Marshall’s concurrence in Procunier v.

23.

Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927).

24.

Kathryn A. Sabbeth, Towards an Understanding of Litigation as
Expression: Lessons from Guantánamo, 44 U.C., Davis L. Rev. 1487,
1525 (2011) (“[C]ourts [can] provide . . . an amplified platform for
attracting public attention for expression of dissent against government
policies.”).

25.

Id. at 1524 (quoting Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First
Amendment Theory, 3 Am. Bar Found. Rsch. J. 521, 550 (1977)).

26.

Tsai, supra note 19, at 853–54 (quoting Gregory A. Mark, The Vestigial
Constitution: The History and Significance of the Right to Petition, 66
Fordham L. Rev. 2153, 2157 (1998)).

27.

See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 419–20 (1963). Button is discussed
in greater detail below. See infra text accompanying notes 37–40.

28.

McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 153 (1992) (quoting Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886)), superseded by statute, PLRA, Pub. L.
No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996), as stated in Woodford v. Ngo, 548
U.S. 81, 84–85 (2006).

29.

Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law 1009 (6th ed. 2019).
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Martinez.30 Procunier involved a First Amendment challenge to a
prison policy requiring incarcerated persons’ incoming and outgoing
mail to be screened by prison staff for prohibited content, such as letters
in which a prisoner was deemed to “‘unduly complain’ or ‘magnify
grievances,’” or letters deemed to be “contraband writings ‘expressing
inflammatory political, racial, religious or other views or beliefs . . . .’”31
In finding the policy unconstitutional, the majority opinion focused on
the First Amendment rights of non-incarcerated persons, reasoning
that:
[C]ensorship of prisoner mail works a consequential restriction on
the First and Fourteenth Amendments rights of those who are
not prisoners.
. . . [T]he First Amendment liberties of free citizens are
implicated in censorship of prisoner mail. We therefore turn for
guidance, not to cases involving questions of “prisoners’ rights,”
but to decisions of this Court dealing with the general problem of
incidental restrictions on First Amendment liberties imposed in
furtherance of legitimate governmental activities.32

The majority opinion therefore strongly indicated that it might
have viewed the issue differently were it framed in terms of the
incarcerated person’s rights. Justice Marshall, by contrast, writing for
himself and Justice Brennan, called for a different understanding, one
grounded in the dignity and autonomy of incarcerated people
themselves. Justice Marshall noted that “[a]lthough the issue of the
First Amendment rights of inmates is explicitly reserved by the Court,
I would reach that issue and hold that prison authorities may not read
inmate mail as a matter of course.”33
Justice Marshall reasoned that:
The First Amendment serves not only the needs of the polity but
also those of the human spirit—a spirit that demands selfexpression. Such expression is an integral part of the development
of ideas and a sense of identity. To suppress expression is to reject
the basic human desire for recognition and affront the individual’s
worth and dignity. . . . When the prison gates slam behind an
inmate, he does not lose his human quality; his mind does not
become closed to ideas; his intellect does not cease to feed on a
free and open interchange of opinions; his yearning for self-respect
does not end; nor is his quest for self-realization concluded. If

30.

416 U.S. 396 (1974), overruled by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401,
413–14 (1989).

31.

Id. at 399.

32.

Id. at 409 (emphasis added).

33.

Id. at 422 (Marshall, J., concurring).

649

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 72·Issue 3·2022
Outsider Speech
anything, the needs for identity and self-respect are more
compelling in the dehumanizing prison environment.34

Justice Douglas joined in the operative portion of Justice Marshall’s
opinion,35 making three Justices who would have invalidated the policy
based upon the incarcerated person’s First Amendment rights,
grounded in the recognition that the status of incarceration does not
remove the constitutional protections applicable to all other persons.
If one accepts that the democratic self-governance and dignity
rationales for protecting freedom of expression apply to incarcerated
persons’ expressive activities, the question then becomes whether the
PLRA and AEDPA’s limitations on litigation implicate free-speech
values. This Essay contends that they do. It is generally recognized that
litigation can have a significant expressive component in addition to its
instrumental value as a means of resolving private disputes and for
vindicating constitutional rights.
The Supreme Court has long recognized that the First Amendment
embraces a “right to advocate” that includes as an essential component
the right to engage in “[e]ffective advocacy of both public and private
points of view.”36 In the realm of litigation, specifically, the Court has
recognized that advocacy through litigation can be a means of
expression protected by the First Amendment. In NAACP v. Button,37
for example, the Court held that Virginia’s broadened restrictions upon
solicitation of clients for legal services as applied to the NAACP
violated the First Amendment because it “infringe[d] the right of the
NAACP and its members and lawyers to associate for the purpose of
assisting persons who seek legal redress for infringements of their
constitutionally guaranteed and other rights.”38 Given the posture of
the case—i.e., restrictions upon lawyers’ expressive activities as part of
a collective entity like the NAACP—much of Button’s reasoning focuses
upon freedom of association and litigation. The Court, however, also
elaborated upon how litigation can have expressive value generally:
[A]bstract discussion is not the only species of communication
which the Constitution protects; the First Amendment also
protects vigorous advocacy . . . . In the context of NAACP
objectives, litigation is not a technique of resolving private
differences; it is a means for achieving the lawful objectives of
equality of treatment . . . . It is thus a form of political
expression. Groups which find themselves unable to achieve their
34.

Id. at 427–28 (citations omitted).

35.

Id. at 428.

36.

NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 461, 460 (1958)
(emphasis added).

37.

371 U.S. 415 (1963).

38.

Id. at 428.
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objectives through the ballot frequently turn to the courts. . . .
[U]nder the conditions of modern government, litigation may well
be the sole practicable avenue open to a minority to petition for
redress of grievances.39

The NAACP’s litigation, the Court reasoned, “while serving to
vindicate the legal rights of members of the American Negro
community, at the same time and perhaps more importantly, makes
possible the distinctive contribution of a minority group to the ideas
and beliefs of our society.”40 Scholars have similarly recognized that in
certain contexts, the expressive component of litigation can be of equal
(or even higher) value than its instrumental goals.41
Some scholarly examinations have focused upon limitations on
litigation specifically through the lens of the First Amendment’s
Petition Clause,42 while others have examined such restrictions more
broadly via the Speech Clause or from the perspective of free-speech
values generally.43 By the same token, some scholars and courts have
focused upon the expressive component of litigation in terms of the
lawyer’s own free-speech interest44 or the client’s interest by proxy;45

39.

Id. at 429–30.

40.

Id. at 431.

41.

See, e.g., Sabbeth, supra note 24, at 1507 (arguing for “a public law
conception of litigation as an essential means of disseminating a message
to government actors and to larger society” in certain kinds of cases);
Lobel, supra note 7, at 479 (“[C[ourts not only function as adjudicators of
private disputes, or institutions that implement social reforms, but as
arenas where political and social movements agitate for, and
communicate, their legal and political agenda.”).

42.

See Carol Rice Andrews, Motive Restrictions on Court Access: A First
Amendment Challenge, 61 Ohio St. L.J. 665 (2000).

43.

See Tsai, supra note 19, at 846 (“Theories of court access that are moored
too tightly to the Petition Clause . . . are unsatisfactory in that they are
not based upon a foundation that draws together other elements of the
First Amendment. Under this admittedly constricted view of the right of
access, only rules that explicitly bar individuals from lodging winning
lawsuits or penalize individuals directly for doing so would raise First
Amendment problems.”).

44.

See Sabbeth, supra note 24, at 1507 (noting that “[t]he high water mark
of protection for lawyers’ speech in support of litigation with a political
purpose was In re Primus,” which “identified First Amendment protection
for a lawyer separate and apart from any right held by a client”).

45.

See, e.g., Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001) (holding
that restrictions upon LSC-funded lawyers’ ability to challenge federal
welfare law violated the First Amendment and were not saved by the
government speech doctrine because “an LSC-funded attorney speaks on
the behalf of the client in a claim against the government for welfare
benefits,” therefore, “[t]he lawyer is not the government’s speaker”).

651

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 72·Issue 3·2022
Outsider Speech

others directly upon the client’s interest;46 still others upon society’s
interest.47 While the doctrinal basis is subject to debate, it is widely
accepted that litigation can have a substantial expressive component.
The PLRA’s and AEDPA’s limitations upon such expression in
cases brought by incarcerated persons therefore raise issues under the
First Amendment; they also raise issues under the Equal Protection
Clause, since those statutes create a classification in the exercise of the
fundamental right of free speech between persons who are incarcerated
and those who are not. This Essay, however, does not engage in a detailed First Amendment or equal-protection doctrinal analysis. Rather,
this Essay brings to bear the insights of free-speech and equalprotection theories as well as the history of similar restrictions upon
adjudicative expression during the slave regime in analyzing the PLRA
and AEDPA.

III. History’s Echoes: Enslaved Persons’ Adjudicative
Speech
The history of American slavery suggests that great concern is
warranted whenever we see legal rules that categorically limit outcast
groups’ access to and use of the judicial system. Slavery was
characterized by the “civil death” of enslaved persons—and in many
states, also of free Black persons—whereby a single trait (i.e.,
Blackness) defined “one’s status before the law for all time, with no
possibility of redemption as a member of civil society.”48 Among the
key features of American slavery as relevant here were procedural and
substantive legal rules excluding enslaved persons from invoking the
judicial system, thereby leaving them at the mercy of their enslavers.49

46.

See, e.g., Tsai, supra note 19, at 841–42 (arguing that “[t]reating the
pursue of redress as [a form of anti-government] dissent marks its role as
the gateway to the political-legal order by linking familiar, time-honored
free speech concepts with a rich understanding of the civil rights plaintiff’s
role in constitutional discourse”).

47.

See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 42, at 768 (“The First Amendment protects
petitions for the further reason that they inform the government and thus
create the potential for advancement of the law and cure of societal
problems. These aims are achieved by the filing of a winning claim, no
matter what the plaintiff thinks. Indeed, society might be deprived of
important changes if the right to go to court were limited by the plaintiff’s
motive.”).

48.

William M. Carter, Jr., Class as Caste: The Thirteenth Amendment’s
Applicability to Class-Based Subordination, 39 Seattle U. L. Rev. 813,
826 (2016).

49.

The generally accepted baseline in the slave states was that “the slave
was outside the protection of the common law.” Thomas D. Morris, Slaves
and the Rules of Evidence in Criminal Trials, 68 Chi.-Kent L. Rev.
1209, 1209 (1993).
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The American Slave Codes “permit[ed] and immuniz[ed] from prosecution or civil recourse the [slaveowners’] violence and coercion
necessary to compel [forced] labor”;50 prohibited slaves (and often also
free Black persons) from forming binding, judicially-enforceable
contracts;51 and barred slaves from testifying in court against white
persons.52 These provisions served to control enslaved persons by limiting their ability to assert claims of freedom or to demand other legal
redress. But they also served the expressive purposes of inflicting terror
and denoting enslaved persons’ lesser status as outcasts from civil
society.53
The Slave Codes also specifically targeted “Blacks’ freedom of
speech and speech about Black freedom”:54
Provisions of various states’ slave codes expressly targeted
freedom of speech. Mississippi’s Slave Code, for example, authorized a sentence ranging from imprisonment at hard labor for up
to twenty-one years to the death penalty [upon conviction] for
50.

Carter, supra note 48, at 817.

51.

See William M. Carter, Jr., A Thirteenth Amendment Framework for
Combating Racial Profiling, 39 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 17, 51 (2004)
(“When slavery was abolished, slave codes in its support were abolished
also. Those laws that prevented the colored man from going from home,
that did not allow him to buy or to sell, or to make contracts; that did
not allow him to own property; that did not allow him to enforce rights;
that did not allow him to be educated, were all badges of servitude made
in the interest of slavery and as a part of slavery.” (emphasis added)
(quoting Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 322 (1866) (statement of
Senator Lyman Trumbull)).

52.

Morris, supra note 49, at 1209 (noting that, under the Slave Codes,
“[s]laves could not testify against whites,” but also noting that the
evidentiary rules became more nuanced during later phases of the slave
regime).

53.

Carter, supra note 48, at 817–18 (arguing that as the denial of rights
under “slavery became fully entrenched, . . . the panoply of laws and
customs [under the Slave Codes] continued to serve their original
instrumental purposes, [but] they also served the expressive purpose of
dehumanizing slaves (and by extension, all blacks) as completely undeserving of either civil rights or moral empathy”); cf. Brown v. Bd. of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (stating that “[t]he impact [of school
segregation] is greater when it has the sanction of the law; for the policy
of separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of
the negro group” (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., No. T-316 (E.D. Kan.
Aug. 3, 1951), reprinted in Transcript of Record at 246, Brown v. Bd. of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954))); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive
Function of Law, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2021, 2051 (1996) (“There can be
no doubt that law, like action in general, has an expressive function. . . .
Many debates over the appropriate content of law are really debates over
the statement that law makes, independent of its (direct) consequences.”).

54.

William M. Carter, Jr., The Second Founding and the First Amendment,
99 Tex. L. Rev. 1065, 1084 (2021).
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“using language having a tendency to promote discontent among
free colored people, or insubordination among slaves.”55

Similar examples abound. North Carolina, for example, in 1830
adopted an “act suppressing expression with a tendency to cause slaves
to rebel. . . . [In] 1836, Virginia passed a comprehensive act aimed at
antislavery agitation.”56 In Kansas, “[t]he proslavery government of the
territory enacted a slave code,” which “made expressing antislavery
opinions a crime . . . .”57 Indeed, “[w]ith the exception of Kentucky,
every Southern state eventually passed laws exercising loose to rigid
control of speech, press, and discussion.”58
In addition to suppressing traditional forms of verbal, written, and
associative expression, the states’ Slave Codes and the federal Fugitive
Slave Acts specifically limited slaves’ adjudicative expression in terms
of their access to or use of the courts.59 The slave states’ rules of
evidence in criminal cases either excluded the testimony of slaves
entirely, in cases involving whites, or otherwise discounted or limited
it.60 In Mississippi, for example, although enslaved persons’ testimony
was inadmissible in cases against whites, the state’s rules of evidence
provided that “[a]ny negro or mulatto, bond or free, shall be a good
witness in pleas of the state, for or against negroes or mulattoes, bond
or free, or in civil pleas where free negroes or mulattoes shall alone be
parties, and in no other cases whatever.”61 Similarly, in Pennsylvania
during the colonial era, because of a special judicial system of “Negro
courts” separate from the regular courts, “[o]ne can surmise that after
1700 blacks could not be witnesses against whites in the regular courts,
since this right was not affirmatively given to free blacks until 1780 and
to slaves until 1847.”62
The federal Fugitive Slave Acts also operated to limit adjudicative
expression by alleged slaves. In Frederick Douglass’s speech commonly
55.

Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting J. Clay Smith, Jr., Justice and Jurisprudence and the Black Lawyer, 69 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1077, 1107 (1994)).

56.

Michael Kent Curtis, The 1859 Crisis Over Hinton Helper’s Book, The
Impending Crisis: Free Speech, Slavery, and Some Light on the Meaning
of the First Section of the Fourteenth Amendment, 68 Chi.-Kent L. Rev.
1113, 1133 (1993) (footnote omitted).

57.

Id. at 1129.

58.

Russel B. Nye, Fettered Freedom: Civil Liberties and the
Slavery Controversy 1830–1860, at 140 (1949).

59.

Morris, supra note 49, at 1209.

60.

Id. (noting that “in the American South[, t]he wholesale exclusion [of
slaves’ testimony against whites] remained in force to the end of slavery”).

61.

Id. at 1210 (quoting Miss. Rev. Code ch. 73, § 21 (1824)).

62.

A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., In the Matter of Color: Race and
the American Legal Process 282 (1978).
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known as What to the Slave is the Fourth of July?,63 Douglass described
how the Fugitive Slave Act expressly silenced the adjudicative speech
of the person claimed to be a slave while privileging the adjudicative
speech of the putative slaveowner. Douglass noted that under the Act:
The oath of any two villains is sufficient . . . to send the most
pious and exemplary black man into the remorseless jaws of
slavery! His own testimony is nothing. He can bring no witnesses
for himself. The minister of American justice is bound by the law
to hear but one side; and that side is the side of the oppressor.64

Douglass was speaking of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850,65 which
expressly provided that “[i]n no trial or hearing under this act shall the
testimony of [the] alleged fugitive [slave] be admitted in evidence,”66
whereas any legally “satisfactory proof” by the alleged slaveowner sufficed for the court to decide the claim summarily in his favor.67 Similar
concerns pertained to the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793.68 Unlike the 1850
Act, the 1793 Act did not specifically bar the testimony of the person
alleged to be a slave. However:
[While t]he terms of the Act did not prohibit the judicial
official from either conducting a hearing if the fugitive lodged a
competing claim of freedom or [from] taking the testimony of the
captured person on such a claim[, t]here was no explicit provision
in the Act . . . encouraging the official to do either. Nor did the
Act contain any other procedural protections for an alleged
runaway who disputed the validity of the claim. Thus, the Act
appeared to provide no more than a summary ministerial proceeding . . . .
....
. . . If the claimant was able, by oral testimony or affidavit, to
satisfy the judge or justice of the peace that the seized person was
the claimant’s slave, then the official . . . granted [a] certificate
authorizing the claimant to remove the person from the state.

63.

Frederick Douglass, The Meaning of July Fourth for the Negro, Speech at
Rochester, New York (July 5, 1852), in Frederick Douglass: Selected
Speeches and Writings 188 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1999).

64.

Id. at 199.

65.

Ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462 (repealed 1864).

66.

Id. § 6.

67.

Id.

68.

Ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302 (repealed 1864).
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The certificate served as conclusive proof against any claim to
freedom by the captured person.69

The Fugitive Slave Acts’ disallowance (in the 1850 Act) or
disregard (in the 1793 Act) of testimony by persons arguing they were
unlawfully detained as alleged slaves rings hauntingly close to AEDPA’s
restrictions upon the habeas claims of incarcerated persons seeking to
establish their entitlement to freedom from incarceration. Both
scenarios entail distortions of the adjudicative process by truncating
exploration on the merits of the detainee’s claims and utilizing
substantive standards tilted heavily against the detainee.70 There are,
of course, many differences between AEDPA and the Fugitive Slave
Acts. Most importantly: under AEDPA, unlike under the Fugitive
Slave Acts, an initial adjudication of the person’s status through the
regular criminal process with full procedural due-process protections
precedes the determination of that status; and subsequent full review
of the legality of the detention remains available outside of the
truncated AEDPA framework, i.e., via state courts or (in theory) via
an original habeas action in the U.S. Supreme Court.71 This Section
therefore does not contend that AEDPA is analogous to the Fugitive
Slave Acts in terms of their respective details. This Essay does contend,
however, that AEDPA and the PLRA create a framework that diminishes incarcerated persons’ ability to have their claims fully heard due
to their civil status, which historically has been a signal that the law
operates differently both because of, and in order to, reinforce the

69.

Barbara Holden-Smith, Lords of Lash, Loom, and Law: Justice Story,
Slavery, and Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 78 Cornell L. Rev. 1086, 1118–19
(1993) (footnotes omitted).

70.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), providing that:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person
in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be
granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the
merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the
claim—
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
State court proceeding.

71.

Cf. id. § 2254(a) (applying AEPDA to a person “in custody pursuant to
the judgement of a State court”); Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 660–61
(1996) (holding that AEDPA “has not repealed [the Supreme Court’s]
authority to entertain original habeas petitions”).
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group’s alienated and despised status.72 This same self-reinforcing
cycle—othering, civil alienation, lesser substantive and procedural legal
protections, which then contribute to the group’s further othering and
invisibility, which renders them yet more distant from civil society and
therefore presumed to be entitled to lesser legal protections, etc.—operated with regard to enslaved persons and operates today with regard to
incarcerated persons, a highly racialized population.73

IV. A Doctrinal Detour: The PLRA and AEDPA
Through a First Amendment Lens
This Essay has thus far examined the PLRA and AEDPA’s
limitations on incarcerated persons’ adjudicative speech as a matter of
history and policy rather than doctrine. This Section sketches the
contours of a First Amendment challenge to these limitations. It does
so not to make the case that such a challenge would necessarily be
successful, but rather to illustrate how such limitations would be
assessed but for the fact that they involve incarcerated persons’ rights—
and by implication, to illustrate how little our legal system values incarcerated persons’ rights.
Under traditional First Amendment doctrine, various provisions of
the PLRA and AEDPA would be classified as content, viewpoint, and
speaker-based restrictions on expression. As such, if applied outside of
the context of incarceration, they would be presumptively unconstitutional.
A.

Content-Based Restrictions on Expression

Under the First Amendment, the government “has no power to
restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter,
or its content”74 unless the government’s action satisfies strict scrutiny.
A law is content based, and therefore presumptively unconstitutional,
if it “applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the

72.

See, e.g., Morris, supra note 49, at 1239 (arguing that during slavery,
“[r]ules of evidence—rules fashioned to control juries and lawyers—were
also constructed to assure the property interests of slave-owners, and the
domination of whites over blacks”).

73.

See supra note 12 and accompanying text (discussing the racial disparities
in mass incarceration).

74.

Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163 (2015) (quoting Police Dep’t
of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972)); see also R.A.V. v. City of
St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (“The First Amendment generally
prevents government from proscribing speech or even expressive conduct
because of disapproval of the ideas expressed. Content-based regulations
are presumptively invalid.” (citations omitted)).
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idea or message expressed.”75 Content-based restrictions of expression
strike at the heart of First Amendment values:
Government action that stifles speech on account of its message,
or that requires the utterance of a particular message favored by
the Government, contravenes [the] essential [First Amendment]
right. [Content-based laws] pose the inherent risk that the
Government seeks not to advance a legitimate regulatory goal,
but to suppress unpopular ideas or information or manipulate the
public debate through coercion rather than persuasion.76

Content-based laws are therefore highly suspect, regardless of
whether the government professes neutral or even benign purposes.
Innocent motives do not eliminate the danger of censorship
presented by a facially content-based statute, as future
government officials may one day wield such statutes to suppress
disfavored speech. . . . “The vice of content-based legislation . . . is not that it is always used for invidious, thoughtcontrol purposes, but that it lends itself to use for those purposes.”77

By these definitions, several provisions of the PLRA and AEDPA
would qualify as content-based restrictions on adjudicative expression
and therefore be subject to strict scrutiny if traditional First
Amendment standards were applied. First, AEDPA’s prohibition of the
filing of “second or successive” habeas claims, subject to only a few very
strict statutory exceptions,78 is a content-based restriction. As noted
75.

Reed, 576 U.S. at 163. Reed held that a law will be deemed content based
if it either: (1) is content based on its face; or (2) “cannot be ‘justified
without reference to the content of the regulated speech,’ or [was] adopted
by the government ‘because of disagreement with the message [the speech]
conveys.’” Id. at 163–64 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S.
781, 791 (1989)).

76.

Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994).

77.

Reed, 576 U.S. at 167 (quoting Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S 703, 743 (2000)
(Scalia, J., dissenting)).

78.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2):
A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was not presented in a prior application
shall be dismissed unless—
(A) the applicant shows that the claim relies on a new rule of
constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review
by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or
(B)(i) the factual predicate for the claim could not have been discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence; and
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above, a speech restriction is content based if it “applies to particular
speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message
expressed.”79 This provision of AEDPA is content-based on its face
because it “defin[es] regulated speech by particular subject matter,”80
i.e., whether the claim is a second or successive habeas claim, in contrast
with a second or successive claim of any other kind. Under the same
reasoning, the PLRA’s physical-injury requirement, which bars suits for
emotional or mental harm while in custody (or at least bars compensatory damages for such harms) absent a prior showing of physical
injury,81 also operates as a content-based restriction on speech. Adjudicative speech containing the subject matter that Congress has specified
(i.e., a prior showing of physical injury) is permitted, whereas adjudicative speech that is the same in all relevant detail but for the absence
of the prescribed content would be prohibited.82
Even assuming that these restrictions were not motivated by
animus against incarcerated persons as a class—a dubious assumption,
given (1) the historic American conflation of race, crime, fear, and the
resulting subordination of people of color,83 and (2) the legislative
(ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of
the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and
convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable
factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying
offense.
79.

Reed, 576 U.S. at 163.

80.

Id.

81.

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) provides that “[n]o Federal civil action may be
brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional
facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without
a prior showing of physical injury.”

82.

This provision of the PLRA is not the run-of-the-mill scenario where
Congress creates a cause of action and then specifies the elements of that
cause of action necessary to state a claim. This provision does not create
a cause of action; rather, it limits the ability to assert a cause of action
arising from another source—whether state tort law, other federal statutory
law, or federal constitutional law—based upon whether it contains content
specified by the government. It would be as if Congress passed a statute
prohibiting federal-court jurisdiction over unreasonable searches and
seizures unless the Fourth Amendment claim states that the allegedly
illegal search or seizure was preceded or accomplished by physical harm.

83.

See, e.g., Paul Finkelman, The Crime of Color, 67 Tul. L. Rev. 2063,
2093 (1993) (“In colonial and early national America color became
associated with inherently criminal behavior in almost every area of law.
Following Virginia’s lead, most of the British mainland colonies began to
create a legal system that made race a prima facie indication of criminality.”); Winthrop D. Jordan, White Over Black 109–10 (2d ed.
2012) (noting that the preamble to the South Carolina Slave Code specifically sought to justify the slave code as necessary to “tend[ing] to the
safety and security of the [white] people of this Province and their estates”
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history of the PLRA and AEDPA84—the Supreme Court’s more recent
First Amendment cases would nonetheless classify the restrictions as
content-based. The Court has made clear that a neutral or benign
underlying governmental purpose does not render a facially contentbased law content-neutral:
A law that is content based on its face is subject to strict scrutiny
regardless of the government’s benign motive, content-neutral
justification, or lack of “animus toward the ideas contained” in
the regulated speech. We have thus made clear that “[i]llicit
legislative intent is not the sine qua non of a violation of the First
Amendment,” and a party opposing the government “need
adduce ‘no evidence of an improper censorial motive.’” . . . In
other words, an innocuous justification cannot transform a
facially content-based law into one that is content neutral.85

Hence, whether these provisions were adopted by Congress to
discourage frivolous litigation, streamline court dockets,86 or accomplish
other purposes is immaterial: their facially differential treatment of
adjudicative expression based upon its subject matter would, under
traditional First Amendment principles, be deemed a content-based
restriction subject to strict scrutiny.
B.

Viewpoint-Based Restrictions on Expression

First Amendment jurisprudence has long considered viewpoint
discrimination to be one of the most pernicious violations of freedom of
(quoting 7 Statutes at Large of South Carolina 352, 371, 385
(David J. McCord ed., 1840))).
84.

See, e.g., Herman, supra note 8, at 264 (“Because the PLRA found its
way into law as a rider to an appropriations bill, Congress did not hold
full hearings to examine the truth about the causes, successes, and challenges
of prison litigation. Instead, the legislative debate was fueled by anecdote,
focusing on a few hand-picked cases mockingly described by four state
Attorneys General in a New York Times letter to the editor.”).

85.

Reed, 576 U.S. at 165–66 (citations omitted) (first quoting City of
Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 429 (1993); and then
quoting Simon & Schuster, Inc., v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims
Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 117 (1991)).

86.

Discouraging truly frivolous litigation and even managing the flow of
prima facie legitimate litigation to ensure that our court system and
individual judges do not become overwhelmed are surely important and
worthy goals. As to the former: frivolity can be screened for and dealt
with in individual cases without placing wholesale limits on categories of
litigation. As to the latter: “One sensible way to go about reducing the
volume of prison litigation would be to reform the prisons, giving prisoners
less to complain about. . . . The number of non-frivolous complaints could
be reduced if the states were to ensure that prison conditions were
minimally humane instead of waiting to be sued.” Herman, supra note 8,
at 263.
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expression. Indeed, viewpoint discrimination is at least de facto subject
to a standard of judicial skepticism even higher than strict scrutiny.87
The Supreme Court has characterized governmental suppression of, or
favoritism toward, speech because of its viewpoint an especially
“egregious form of content discrimination.”88 Viewpoint discrimination
is considered particularly offensive to free-speech values because “the
[F]irst [A]mendment is concerned, not only with the extent to which a
law reduces the total quantity of communication, but also—and perhaps even more fundamentally—with the extent to which the law
distorts public debate.”89 Speech restrictions that are based upon the
speaker’s point of view distort public debate because they reduce the
amount of information available to the public regarding only one side
of a given public debate and therefore interfere with “the thinking
process of the community.”90
Scholars have conceptualized constitutional litigation as a form of
anti-government expression:
[T]he act of suing a branch of government or public official in
court is an explicit, often multi-faceted, challenge to the authority
of the defendant-government in the name of the public
interest. . . .
....
. . . Whether a lawsuit demands monetary damages or
equitable relief, every civil rights plaintiff seeks a formal,
enforceable declaration that certain government enactments,
policies, or practices exceed the government’s lawful authority.91

87.

See Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of
Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev.
413, 444 (1996) (reviewing cases and explaining that “the [Supreme] Court
often differentiates between view-point-based restrictions and all other
content-based restrictions” and “[i]t is not so much that the Court formally
uses two different standards for subject matter and viewpoint regulation”
but that in practice, “the Court almost always rigorously reviews and then
[simply] invalidates regulations based on viewpoint” rather than applying
strict scrutiny).

88.

Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995);
see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 392 (1992) (stating that
“[the government] has no such authority to license one side of a debate to
fight freestyle, while requiring the other to follow Marquis of Queensberry
rules”).

89.

Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 Wm.
& Mary L. Rev. 189, 198 (1983).

90.

Id. (quoting Alexander Meiklejohn, Free Speech and Its Relation
to Self-Government 26 (1948)).

91.

Tsai, supra note 19, at 870–71.
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Courts too have recognized litigation as a form of dissent and
protest.92 Under this view, litigation by incarcerated persons challenging
the legality or conditions of their detention amount to speech expressing
an anti-government viewpoint because they argue, in essence, that the
government lacks power over them at all (contrary to the government’s
position, as expressed by the act of incarceration, that their detention
is lawful); or that the government’s treatment of them is unlawful
(contrary to the government’s position, as evidenced by its act of
allowing government officials to engage in the treatment). Under this
view, the PLRA’s and AEDPA’s restrictions upon incarcerated persons’
anti-government adjudicative expression seeking their freedom or
raising claims about their conditions of confinement would be classified
as viewpoint discrimination. These forms of adjudicative expression are
subject to greater restrictions and less favorable treatment than other
forms of adjudicative expression by incarcerated persons that are progovernment in their viewpoints: e.g., written plea agreements, in-court
guilty pleas and allocutions, confessions (whether written and submitted to the court or made orally in court), etc.93
If traditional First Amendment doctrine were applied to the
PLRA’s and AEDPA’s restrictions on incarcerated persons adjudicative
speech, the venues for such speech (i.e., courts) would likely be classified
as limited public forums.94 Although content discrimination in a limited
public forum, in the sense of constraining the forum to its originally
intended purpose or audience, is permissible,95 viewpoint discrimination
in such a forum is not. Even in a limited public forum, “[t]he State’s
power to restrict speech . . . is not without limits. The restriction must

92.

See, e.g., Sabbeth, supra note 24, at 1508 (characterizing the Supreme
Court’s decision in In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978), as “embrac[ing] the
notion of litigation as a mode of political expression and, more specifically,
as a particularly valuable means of voicing political dissent”).

93.

For example, compare Banister v. Davis, 140 S. Ct. 1698, 1704 (2020)
(describing the restrictions that AEDPA imposes on prisoners seeking to
challenge their habeas convictions), with Freeman v. United States, 564
U.S. 522, 527 (2011) (explaining that the defendant received a sentence
reduction for entering a guilty plea with the government). See also Tsai,
supra note 19, at 889–91.

94.

A limited public forum is a venue for expression that the government has
“created for a limited purpose such as use by certain groups or for the
discussion of certain subjects.” Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Loc. Educators’
Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 n.7 (1983) (citation omitted).

95.

Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106 (2001) (stating
that “[w]hen the State establishes a limited public forum, the State is not
required to and does not allow persons to engage in every type of speech”).
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not discriminate against speech on the basis of viewpoint, and the restriction must be ‘reasonable in light of the purpose served by the
forum.’”96
C.

Speaker-Based Restrictions on Expression

By singling out a class of potential speakers (here, incarcerated
persons) for restrictions upon their speech, the PLRA’s and AEDPA’s
limitations on adjudicative expression would, if applied in any other
context, also likely be classified as speaker-based restrictions under the
Supreme Court’s most recent First Amendment cases. Speaker-based
laws, like content-based laws, are subject to strict scrutiny because
“[s]peaker-based laws run the risk that ‘the State has left unburdened
those speakers whose messages are in accord with [the State’s] own
views.’”97 The Court has therefore made clear that its precedents are
“deeply skeptical” of speaker-based restrictions on speech.98 In Citizens
United v. FEC,99 for example, the Court reasoned that restrictions upon
electioneering speech applicable only to certain speakers (i.e., corporations and unions) violated the First Amendment.100 In addition to
finding the restrictions to be impermissibly content-based, the Court
also found that the speaker-based nature of the restrictions
independently rendered them unconstitutional. The Court reasoned
that “[q]uite apart from the purpose or effect of regulating content,
moreover, the Government may commit a constitutional wrong when
by law it identifies certain preferred speakers.”101
In Sorrell v. IMS Health,102 the Supreme Court similarly found a
speaker-based restriction on speech to be unconstitutional. Sorrell
involved a state law prohibiting various persons and entities from
selling, using, or disclosing pharmacy records containing information
96.

Id. at 106–07 (citation omitted) (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def.
& Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U. S. 788, 806 (1985)).

97.

Nat'l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2378 (2018)
(quoting Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 580 (2011)); see also
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010) (holding that the First
Amendment prohibits “restrictions distinguishing among different speakers,
allowing speech by some but not others” and “[a]s instruments to censor,
these categories are interrelated: Speech restrictions based on the identity
of the speaker are all too often simply a means to control content”); IMS
Health, 564 U.S. at 565 (2011) (supporting its holding by noting “that
strict scrutiny applies to regulations reflecting ‘aversion’ to what ‘disfavored
speakers’ have to say” (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S.
622, 658 (1994))).

98.

NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2378.

99.

558 U.S. 310 (2010).

100. Id. at 321, 341.
101. Id. at 340 (emphasis added).
102. 564 U.S. 552 (2011).
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about doctors’ prescribing practices.103 The law further provided that
“[p]harmaceutical manufacturers and pharmaceutical marketers shall
not use prescriber-identifiable information for marketing or promoting
a prescription drug unless the prescriber consents.”104 The Court found
that “[t]he statute thus disfavors marketing, that is, speech with a particular content. More than that, the statute disfavors specific speakers,
namely pharmaceutical manufacturers.”105 The Court therefore applied
heightened scrutiny to the restrictions and found that they failed to
satisfy the heavy burden entailed.106
Most recently, the Supreme Court in NIFLA v. Becerra107 also
found a speaker-based restriction to be unconstitutional.108 NIFLA
involved a California law mandating that pro-life pregnancy counseling
centers provide certain notices to their clientele, including whether they
were licensed by the state.109 The state’s proffered justification was to
avoid the risk of clients being misled or confused about whether such
facilities were licensed by the state.110 The Supreme Court found that
this notice provision amounted to “a government-scripted, speakerbased disclosure requirement,”111 because the provision by its terms only
applied to those facilities that “primarily provide[d] ‘pregnancy-related’
services. Thus, a facility that advertises and provides pregnancy tests
is covered by the [notice requirement], but a facility across the street
that advertises and provides nonprescription contraceptives is excluded—even though the latter is no less likely to make women think
it is licensed.”112 Hence, there being no relevant difference in the Court’s
view between the different classes of speakers, the provision burdening
the speech of only one class of speakers raised the specter that the state
chose to disadvantage those speakers because it disliked their message.
To be clear: there is much to criticize in Citizens United, Sorrell,
and NIFLA. Given that those cases are currently settled law, however,
this Essay contends that their principles and reasoning regarding
speaker-based restrictions would apply—as a matter of policy if not
strict doctrine—with at least equal force to incarcerated persons as a
class as they do to corporations, unions, pharmaceutical companies, or
103. Id. at 557.
104. Id. at 559 (quoting Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 4631 (2017)).
105. Id. at 564.
106. Id. at 557, 565.
107. 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
108. Id. at 2378.
109. Id. at 2368–70.
110. Id. at 2369–70.
111. Id. at 2377.
112. Id. at 2378 (citation omitted).
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pregnancy-counseling centers as a class. The underlying principle is the
same: the government may not limit or disadvantage the expression of
a class of speakers absent a truly compelling government interest that
could be achieved in no other manner.
Even accepting that the PLRA’s and AEDPA’s restrictions upon
incarcerated persons’ adjudicative expression amount to speaker-based
restrictions under the cases discussed above, the Supreme Court’s
reasoning in cases like Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor
Union113 could be used as evidence that such restrictions serve a
government interest that is sufficiently weighty to outweigh the
incarcerated person’s speech interest. In Jones, the Court rejected First
Amendment and equal-protection challenges to a prison policy barring
solicitation, meetings, and mailings to and from prisoners in connection
with union organizing.114 The Court reasoned that the policy was valid
because “[l]awful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal
or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the
considerations underlying our penal system.”115 Hence, the Court
reasoned, “[i]n a prison context, an inmate does not retain those First
Amendment rights that are ‘inconsistent with his status as a prisoner
or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system,’”116 and that deference should be extended to prison officials in
making such determinations.117
Even if one accepts the reasoning of Jones on its facts, it is
inapplicable to many of the PLRA’s and AEDPA’s restrictions upon
incarcerated persons’ adjudicative speech. Jones clearly holds that an
incarcerated person retains all of their First Amendment rights except
those that are inconsistent with a person’s status as a prisoner or with
legitimate penological interests.118 As to the latter: unlike in Jones,
where penological interests were found to inherently entail constraints
upon gatherings by incarcerated persons and monitoring their communications with persons outside of the prison system, no such objective
pertains to the PLRA’s and AEDPA’s wholesale limitations upon
incarcerated persons’ adjudicative speech. While there is presumably
some interest of the government in limiting incarcerated persons’ ability
to challenge the legality of their detention or conditions of confinement,
113. 433 U.S. 119 (1977).
114. Id. at 121.
115. Id. at 125 (quoting Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948)).
116. Id. at 129 (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974)).
117. Id. at 128.
118. Jones held that “challenges to prison restrictions that are asserted to
inhibit First Amendment interests must be analyzed in terms of the
legitimate policies and goals of the corrections system, to whose custody
and care the prisoner has been committed in accordance with due process
of law.” Id. at 125 (quoting Pell, 417 U.S. at 822).
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a mere government interest in limiting challenges to its authority
cannot by itself be a legitimate—let alone compelling—government
interest for purposes of the First Amendment119 (or the Due Process
Clause, for that matter). And to the extent that Jones’s language
regarding the permissibility of restricting First Amendment rights
based upon the person’s mere “status as a prisoner” is based upon that
status alone, uncoupled with penological interests, it clearly runs afoul
of the Court’s cases holding that “if the constitutional conception of
‘equal protection of the laws’ means anything, it must at the very least
mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular
group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.”120
For the reasons explained above, if the provisions of the PLRA and
AEDPA that restrict, burden, or disallow incarcerated persons’ adjudicative speech were to be analyzed under traditional First Amendment
doctrines, it is likely they would be found to be unconstitutional as
content-, viewpoint-, or speaker-based restrictions on expression. But,
of course, courts have not so analyzed them, which returns to the main
theme of this Essay: why does our legal system accept these restrictions
upon incarcerated persons’ fundamental freedoms when they would be
rejected in nearly any other context?

Conclusion
“Prison walls serve not merely to restrain offenders but also to
isolate them.”
—Procunier v. Martinez (Justice Thurgood Marshall, concurring).121

This Essay suggests that the most likely answer to the question at
the end of the preceding section is an unspoken truth: our legal system
accepts sui generis deprivations of incarcerated persons’ fundamental
rights because we do. The status of incarceration in our society operates
119. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
509 (1969) (stating that “[i]n order for . . . school officials to justify
prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, it must be able to show
that its action was caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid
the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular
viewpoint”).
120. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973); see also Romer
v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634–35 (1996) (citing Moreno and holding that a
state constitutional amendment prohibiting localities from enacting laws
prohibiting discrimination of the basis of sexual orientation was a “statusbased enactment divorced from any factual context from which we could
discern a relationship to legitimate state interests; it is a classification of
persons undertaken for its own sake, something the Equal Protection
Clause does not permit”).
121. 416 U.S. 396, 426 (1974), overruled by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S.
401 (1989).
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to “create a large, racialized, near-permanent underclass unable to overcome its alienation from civil society.”122 The PLRA’s and AEDPA’s
burdening and silencing of incarcerated persons’ legal claims is but one
of many depredations and denials of dignity that we are willing to
tolerate being inflicted upon “them” but would never tolerate being
inflicted upon us.

122. Carter, supra note 48, at 826.
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